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SUBJECT: AFTER CONVINCING CFC REPS, AGWAI PRESENTS MSA PLAN TO
DONORS

REFTEL: KHARTOUM 1610

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai and Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada have requested donor assistance to pay CFC representatives four months of arrears of the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) and then suspend the CFC. While the CFC representatives expressed no opposition to this plan, according to Agwai, AMIS needs approximately 4.6 million dollars in donor support to pay the arrears. Adada and Agwai presume that the UN/AU-sponsored negotiations scheduled to begin in Libya on October 27 will result in agreement on new security arrangements between the Sudanese Government and Darfur's rebel movements. The UK asked that an audit of previous donor funding to the AU be completed by the end of 2007. CDA Powers questioned whether Agwai's plan would alleviate the threat to AMIS and UNAMID in the long term given the movement's lack of resources and noted that presumably CFC restructuring would require the approval of the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). End summary.

AGWAI's PLAN

¶2. (SBU) Meeting with representatives of the Tripoli Format governments in Khartoum on October 18, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander Agwai and Joint Special Representative Adada have requested donor assistance to pay four months of arrears in the monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) to Cease-fire Commission (CFC) representatives at the original rate and then suspend the CFC. Agwai and Adada made the original proposal during an October 12 meeting of the Tripoli Format, where Agwai asserted that the MSA issue posed a threat to AMIS forces and that the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) should be free of "baggage" from AMIS as it deploys (reftel).

¶3. (SBU) Agwai proposed payment of half of the arrears in the near term and the remainder after the movements' representatives return vehicles stolen from the AU; provide leads on attacks against AMIS assets; and turn in their AU berets, armbands, and insignia. The party representatives would also have to sign a statement acknowledging payment of the MSA in full through September 30, accept the cessation of the MSA payment beginning October 1, and agree to vacate occupancy of facilities within AMIS camps. The movements would no longer be expected to participate in the CFC after October 1 and only a limited number of "liaison" representatives (likely 10), located in El Fasher, would be accredited to AMIS.

¶4. (SBU) Agwai explained that he does not want UNAMID to have any responsibility for the support of the party representatives nor for

them to be considered UN employees. (Note: As the UNAMID Chief of Plan acknowledged during a recent meeting, the AU's May 28, 2004 agreement with the parties on the modalities of the CFC can be interpreted as indicating that party representatives are CFC employees funded by AMIS. End note.) Based on reports of "inside" assistance to the perpetrators of the early October attack on an AMIS camp near Haskanita and other threat information, Agwai also wants to limit representatives' access to AMIS sites.

¶15. (SBU) According to Agwai, the CFC representatives expressed no opposition to his plan during an October 16 meeting in El Fasher, including a suspension of their participation in the CFC. Agwai committed the AU to pay one month of MSA arrears during the week of October 22. Agwai believes he has established credibility with the representatives and that they will comply with this proposal. He also noted that, without the representatives, the CFC is able to conduct more rapid and efficient investigations of potential cease-fire violations.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL

¶16. (SBU) Representatives of the UK and the Netherlands, which have funded MSA payments in the past, expressed concern over the lack of sufficient accountability for previous funds allotted. The UK Defense Attaché said there was no accounting document for payments made between January and March, 2007 nor an explanation as to why there were as many as 87 SLM representatives to the CFC in El Fasher. Regardless of Agwai's new plan, he requested that an "audit trail" be completed before January 1, 2008 when AMIS would cease to exist. The Dutch Ambassador concurred. They also asked if other donors would be willing to meet the additional funding request. Given the lack of preparedness for making a commitment, no offers

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were forthcoming, although there was consensus that the briefing statement would be shared with capitals.

¶17. (SBU) CDA Powers questioned whether Agwai's plan would alleviate the threat to AMIS posed by disaffected and under-resourced rebels in the long term. It is worth noting that while the CFC is dysfunctional, it is founded in the DPA and the Ndjamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement. Presumably, CFC restructuring would require the approval of the agreements' signatories.

¶18. (SBU) Responding to a question from the UK Defense Attaché, Agwai said that the AU has the resources and "strength" to investigate potential ceasefire violations independently until a new security monitoring mechanism can be established through the UN/AU peace process. Adada acknowledged that the UK and France had presented the UN/AU with a model for such a mechanism for the interim period, which is being reviewed in New York and Addis Ababa.

POWERS